Abstract. This paper investigates the potential change in the securities market pricing behavior of 16 large, global automakers following disclosure of the Volkswagen emission cheating scandal. The triggering public disclosure occurred on September 18, 2015, when the EPA issued a notice of violation to VW, stating that VW had intentionally circumvented the US clean air rules for diesel car emissions. The EPA notice unleashed a torrent of responses and disclosures by the company, regulators, investigators, stakeholders, and others. We first examine and contend that this event may have unblocked what economists call an informational cascade, in that much of the information on VW diesel car emissions was already known to interested parties, yet no significant market response occurred until the September 18 EPA notice. Second, we predict and find a significant change around this event in the stochastic evolution of equity and credit default swap prices in the automobile industry. In the post-emission-cheating-scandal period, this change is consistent with increased market co-integration. A test of economic significance further supports this finding by showing a decrease in the profitability of a hypothetical arbitrage trading rule based on lead-lag pricing relations in the equity and CDS markets.
Introduction
On Friday, September 18, 2015, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a notice of violation of the Clean Air Act accusing Volkswagen AG and affiliates (hereafter VW) of using a software device that falsified the official emission tests of almost one-half million of its diesel cars sold in the United States in [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] . While, initially, the media paid limited attention to this notice (31 stories on "emissions tests" from "all sources," according to Factiva on September 18), coverage expanded rapidly over the next several days, totaling 2,299 cumulative news items by Thursday, September 24 (based on the same Factiva search criteria). Stories of the VW emission cheating scandal continued to make world headlines over the next several months as Volkswagen announced product recalls and management changes, regulators disclosed investigations, customers and investors alleged fraud, and others commenced additional inquiries of emission cheating devices, including their possible use by the other major automakers. The market reaction to these initial stories was swift and punishing as investors drove VW's stock price from €167.6 (close on September 17) to €119.6 (close on September 24), amounting to a 28.6 percent drop over five trading days. As our title suggests, we define this collective episode of news events and market pricing behavior centered on the initial EPA notice as the "VW emission cheating scandal."
Curiously, however, much of the information in the EPA notice was or could have reasonably been inferred from reports already in the public domain, leaving many investors flummoxed about why security market prices had not adjusted to these prior reports. Numerous reports suggest that the scandal originated many years earlier, when the US and European automobile regulators tightened their emission standards. Two published studies, in particular, highlighted serious deficiencies in the This paper addresses two issues that, to the best of our knowledge, remain unexplored in the literature. We first examine whether the events and market pricing behavior around the VW emission cheating scandal suggest the unblocking of an informational cascade (Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Banerjee 1992; Welch 1992; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003) . Briefly, an informational cascade (discussed further in Section 2) occurs when information in the hands of one person (or a small group) remains blocked from others because market prices depend more on the common information and actions of "many" rather than the information or actions of a "few." An information shock, however, dislodges the cascade if the many who have previously set prices can no longer ignore the information of a few.
Even a small change in a critical variable made public can be the tipping point that unblocks a cascade (Grenadier 1999) . 2 Second, we build on the first issue and test for a significant relation between the presumed informational cascade and a potential change in the stochastic evolution of automobile manufacturers' securities prices. Specifically, we examine the prices of 16 of the world's largest automakers in two different financial markets, namely, the equity and credit default swap (CDS) markets. We analyze the stochastic evolution of the relation between the returns in one securities market and the returns in the other (their co-integration) and predict an increase in the co-integration of these markets in the aftermath of the initial news of the scandal. Consistent with the notion of an informational cascade, we associate this change in market co-integration with an increase in information aggregation from the scandal. We also test for an implication of this prediction, namely, that the potentially greater market co-integration in the post-scandal period generates lower arbitrage profits from a trading rule exploiting the lead-lag relation between equity returns and changes in CDS spreads.
Our motivation to address these issues draws on three considerations. We first ask whether the VW emission cheating scandal might resemble a real-life case of an informational cascade, which the literature claims to exist but has so far shown mainly in theoretical or experimental terms. Second, conditional on the first question, we predict that this real-life cascade unblocked by an outside event has a "game changing" effect in the way financial markets operate in the global automobile industry.
We find this interesting because the events and pricing behavior we examine relate to stocks and CDSs whose trades and market prices are set mainly by sophisticated individuals at large institutions, 2 As we explain in Section 2.1, an informational cascade is a special form of herding behavior, wherein actors' interactions with each other produce a common, convergent behavior. What distinguishes an informational cascade from herding is that for a period of time some actors may rationally ignore their valuable private information when participating in a market situation, which can create an unstable balance of buyers and sellers interacting in that setting (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003) . Scharfstein and Stein (1990) also suggest that private information may cascade because fund managers may disregard their private information and trade with information common to many fund managers due to the potential risk to their reputation of acting differently. Wermers (1999) finds contrary evidence, however, suggesting that herding behavior relates more to concerns about private information than concerns about reputation.
arguably the least likely actors to succumb to the trap of common information. Third, we expect that our study will add new results to the broader literature on securities markets' co-integration, which thus far shows substantial variation in the extent and direction of co-integration, perhaps because most of the prior studies (discussed in Section 2) are non-industry-specific or do not focus on co-integration dynamics around an exogenous event, with the possible exception of studies of bank securities around the 2007-2008 global financial crisis (Trutwein and Schiereck 2011; Avino, Lazar, and Varotto 2013; da Silva, Rebelo, and Afonso 2014; Narayan, Sharma, and Thuraisamy 2014; Forte and Lovreta 2015) .
Our study generates the following results. We first conclude that the September 18, 2015 EPA notice may have unblocked market behavior that resembles an informational cascade, in that pertinent information questioning the VW emission tests was already in the public domain. Yet, based on an event study, that information had been poorly aggregated in equity prices and CDS spreads before the EPA notice. The prior known information had also come from credible sources, namely, independent research groups. Second, we find a significant and sustained change in the stochastic evolution of prices in the equity and credit markets consistent with accelerated information aggregation from the unblocking event. Specifically, we find a significant decrease in the predictive pattern between lagged equity returns and contemporaneous changes in CDS spreads and a significant increase in the predictive pattern between contemporaneous equity returns and contemporaneous changes in CDS spreads from before to after the unblocking event. We find no evidence, however, of a significant change in the predictive pattern between lagged CDS spread changes and contemporaneous equity returns, consistent with the relative absence of informed traders in the CDS market compared with the stock market.
Together these documented changes in the evolution of equity returns and CDS spread changes have three important implications. They first imply that the VW emission cheating cascade was potentially so powerful and sustained that it changed the relative informedness of the equity and credit markets, specifically, investors' informedness regarding the securities of VW and the other German automakers. Second, they imply that the worldwide attention given to the VW emission cheating scandal potentially improved capital market efficiency by increasing the speed of response of automakers' securities to new information, especially in the CDS market. Third, they imply a decrease in the potential profitability of arbitrage trading based on lagged correlations between automakers' equity prices and CDS spreads. We test and find that the profitability of a hypothetical trading rule based on a one-to two-day lag in the incorporation of equity returns into CDS spread changes decreases in the post-scandal period. This trading rule may have practical relevance, in that the stocks and CDSs of the large automakers trade frequently, thus allowing short trading in stocks and CDSs to occur over narrow intervals with minimal liquidity risk.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 states the hypotheses following a discussion of the prior literature. Section 3 describes the sample and research design. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes. Bikhchandani et al. (1992) (theoretical model and examples), Banerjee (1992) (theoretical model), and Welch (1992) (theoretical model and IPO pricing application) were among the first to advance the notion that informational cascades can occur in rationally functioning markets. Those papers contend that an informational cascade occurs "when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard to his own information." Bikhchandani et al. (1992, 994) . Those papers further advance the view that informational cascades are fragile or brittle, and can be shattered or dislodged by the arrival of "a little information or the mere possibility of value change (even if the change does not occur)…" Bikhchandani et al. (1992 Bikhchandani et al. ( , 1004 . Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) review the literature on cascading (and herding behavior) and in the context of rational learning in capital markets. They point out that while cascading and herding share much in common (e.g., about the effects of learning from observing or imitating the actions of others), a distinguishing feature of a cascade is that the "observational learning ... is so informative that an individual's action does not depend on his own private signal" (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003, 28) . Their study suggests that the presence of the following seven interrelated characteristics (which we apply to examine qualitative hypothesis H1 below) will indicate a strong likelihood of a cascade: (1) slow and poor information aggregation about what could be attained with less imitation or observation of others' earlier actions or behaviors; (2) an evolving publicly observable state variable dependent on credible endorsement; (3) information idiosyncratic to the investor or firm affecting the follower investors; (4) a large pool of public information held by many compared with some critical information held by a few; (5) an observable shock that unblocks the cascade, producing accelerated information aggregation; (6) a fragile pricing equilibrium that could be dislodged by the smallest signal; and (7) diverse investor preferences and mixed investment payoffs before cascade dislodgement. We state the following qualitative hypothesis based on how these characteristics accord with the information flow and pricing behavior around the VW emission cheating scandal.
Literature and hypotheses

Cascades in financial markets
H1: The VW emission cheating scandal resembles an informational cascade. 
Information shocks and the co-integration of security prices
Numerous studies examine the joint evolution of prices in multiple securities markets or, more generally, the co-integration of those markets, often to understand the location of informed investors.
The key studies in this area (Kwan 1996; Norden and Weber 2004; Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh 2005; Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis 2005; Zhu 2006; Berndt and Ostrovnaya 2008; Norden 2009), however, show little uniformity of findings that might help benchmark our results on the co-integration of large automakers' equity prices and CDS spreads. The more recent literature, though, favors equity investors as the more informed traders. Hillscher, Pollet, and Wilson (2015) find that equity returns lead CDS spread under most market conditions, suggesting that while CDS dealers might represent sophisticated institutions, most CDS expertise involves credit risk management where liquidity and hedging can have priority over price discovery. Griffin, Hong, and Kim (2016) offer a similar conclusion, showing the existence of a significant predictive pattern between equity short selling and future CDS returns, implying that informed investors more likely reside in the equity markets.
Closer to our investigation, several studies examine whether and how the recent banking crises might have influenced the lead-lag pricing relations in the equity and CDS markets. But these studies, too, show mixed results, thus offering little guidance as to the expected market association effects with and without an information shock. They also focus primarily on firms in the financial sector. For example, Berndt and Obreja (2010) , Avino et al. (2013) , and Narayan (2015) find that CDS spreads were more informative than equity prices during the global financial crisis of 2007 -2008 whereas Narayan et al. (2014) and Forte and Lovreta (2015) find the opposite result -that equity prices were more informative than CDS spreads during the same period. In addition, Trutwein and Schiereck (2011) and Wang and Moore (2012) These mixed results mean that it remains an open question as to whether informed trading for automakers' securities occurs first in the CDS market or the equity market and whether this might change during periods of accelerated information aggregation. As such, for the purposes of hypothesis testing, we first establish an empirical model of the CDS equity market relation in a setting without a significant information shock of the caliber of the EPA notice (i.e., the period prior to September 18, 2015) . We then assume that the model remains unchanged in the period after the information shock, so that only changes in the parameters of that model potentially reflect a response to that shock. 4 Given the prior literature, those changes could favor the location of more informed trading in the CDS or equity market (or both). Accordingly, we state the following hypothesis in the alternative form of an increase in the co-integration of automakers' equity and CDS security prices from the accelerated change in information aggregation following the VW emission cheating scandal.
H2: The VW emission cheating scandal changed the stochastic evolution of prices of automakers' securities in the equity and credit markets consistent with an increase in the co-integration of those markets.
There is no reason, however, to expect that the change in global automakers' market cointegration in response to the VW emission cheating scandal should be directionally identical for all firms, although common regulatory environments and industry practices suggest that no automaker could expect full immunity from the effects of a negative market reaction. Lastly, we collect emission-related news stories from before and after September 18, 2015, from Factiva and ProQuest using the search term "auto emissions tests" applied to "all sources."
We also limit our sample to VW and other large global automobile manufacturers for reasons unrelated to the CDS data constraint. First, investors and the media considering the VW emission cheating scandal paid considerable attention to these firms, especially compared with the other firms in the S&P Global Auto index, such as large automobile parts suppliers and automobile servicing firms.
These firms, in expectation, had little involvement in the emission cheating scandal. Second, investors trade the large automakers' equities and CDSs in liquid and efficient markets (and in multiple markets for the automakers' equities), so that we can rely on daily equity returns and spread changes to reflect trade prices rather than approximations based on bid-ask quotes or order flow. 7 The extensive trading of these firms' securities also makes it less likely they would experience an informational cascade.
Third, we consider these firms comparable in most respects other than their potential use of emission cheating devices, so they would be natural alternatives for inclusion in investors' portfolios.
To illustrate the extent of market disruption around the first news of the scandal, we first take a close-up view and summarize in Table 1 increase the probability of default on firms' outstanding debt, with the result that CDS spreads should increase. As expected, Table 1 shows that the five-year CDS spreads increase substantially for VW and Porsche, increasing by 203 percent and 116 percent, respectively. On the other hand, the spread increases for the other automakers are much lower. We also note from Table 1 that over this first week of trading that not one firm escaped a market penalty -of either a decrease in stock price or an increase in CDS spread.
[insert Table 1 here] Table 1 also enables a preliminary check on the extent of market co-integration around the short interval of scandal-initiating events, by calculating the percentage of same firm-days with spread changes and returns of the opposite sign. Focusing on the Table 1 interval of t = September 18 to 24, 2015, we calculate that 68.75 percent of day t returns and day t CDS changes have the opposite sign versus 59.38 percent of day t-1 returns and day t CDS changes and 54.7 percent of day t returns and day t-1 CDS changes. While an imperfect measure, this suggests partial co-integration during this window, since if the equity and CDS price setters were equivalently informed they would in theory respond oppositely 100 percent of the time on day t, assuming both markets viewed the news items as equally risk relevant. clearly shows a precipitous decline in stock price and a significant peak in CDS spread around the initial emission disclosures, with the largest spikes occurring on September 21 and 22, the first two trading days after the EPA notice. The news stories also jump significantly on those days, consistent with accelerated information aggregation, although they peak several days later (September 25) as the scandal expanded and deepened.
[insert Figure 1 here]
We also plot in Figure 2 the daily equity return of Volkswagen AG from January 1, 1980 to March 26, 2016. As a measure of stock volatility, we note that this plot shows several spikes over the longer period. One inference is that the events surrounding the emission cheating scandal of late 2015
do not represent unusual stock volatility that was not experienced earlier by VW stockholders. Because stock volatility has been shown to proxy for the speed of information aggregation potentially caused by varying degrees of investor attention (Andrei and Hasler 2015) , the presence of prior periods of high stock volatility makes it even more puzzling that VW, potentially, would experience an informational cascade around the emission cheating scandal. 9 This further motivates our study.
[insert Figure 2 here]
Research design
Our research design involves (1) analyzing qualitatively whether the events and market behavior around the emission cheating scandal have the hallmarks of an informational cascade unblocked by the disclosures of September 18, 2015, and shortly thereafter (H1), and (2) testing statistically whether the accelerated information aggregation from the scandal changed the co-integration of the equity and CDS markets (H2 and H3). We test for a change in market co-integration in three steps. where CHCDS = percentage change in five-year CDS spread, MKT = return on market index, SMB and HML = Fama-French size and book-to-market ratio factors, respectively, and ε t = uncorrelated error, all on day t, and where RET t-k and CHCDS t-k = equity return and percentage change in five-year CDS spread day t-k for k = 0, 1, and 2, respectively.
Second, we split the data series into pre-and post-emission-scandal observations and conduct the same analyses for each partition. The changes in the coefficients from these pre-post analyses enable us to test for a potential change in the co-integration of these markets following the accelerated information aggregation from the emission cheating scandal. For example, should lagged equity returns predict CDS spread changes in the pre-scandal period, we would expect significantly negative coefficients for β 5 or β 6 in Eq. (1). In addition, should lagged equity returns not lead CDS spread changes in the post-scandal period, potentially, because of increased co-integration of the equity and CDS markets, we would not expect significantly negative coefficients for β 5 or β 6 in Eq. (1) in the post-scandal period. However, we would expect the coefficient for β 4 in Eq.
(1) to become more negative from the pre-to the post-scandal period, arguably reflecting increased co-integration from a stronger contemporaneous relation between equity returns and spread changes.
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Third, as a check on steps one and two, we estimate firm-level vector autoregression (VAR) models of order two for daily equity returns and spread changes. As a precondition for this analysis, we conduct Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests of time-series stationarity. Based on the signs and significance of the coefficients from these regression approaches, we assess whether equity returns lead CDS changes or vice versa over the full and the pre-and post-sample periods. We also conduct firm-level tests of Granger causation, which is another way to understand whether the emission cheating scandal induced changes in the lead-lag relation between daily equity returns and spread changes for our automaker sample.
Fourth, we examine the pre-scandal observations in both markets to assess the likelihood that precursory events and reports relating to the EPA notice of September 18, 2015, might have dislodged the presumed information cascade earlier by conducting an event study. We select six emission-related events in the public domain that investors might reasonably have inferred as relating to VW cheating on its emission tests prior to the EPA notice.
As a final step test of increased market co-integration, we implement a hypothetical trading rule.
We premise this rule on the assumption that lagged equity returns more likely predict CDS spread changes than vice versa. Specifically, we take a short position in the CDS of each automaker on day t if either of RET t-1 or RET t-2 < 0 and hold the short position for k = 1 to 5 days. We take no action if either of RET t-1 or RET t-2 > 0. 11 We then measure the change in CDS spread over for k = 1 to 5 days as a proxy for the profitability of this trading rule. If the co-integration of the equity and CDS markets increases in the post-scandal period, the profitability of this trading rule should decrease. 
Results
Analysis of informational cascade characteristics
This sub-section qualitatively compares the seven characteristics of an informational cascade with the events and market behavior around the VW emission cheating scandal (outlined in sub-section 2.1). We state the cascade characteristic (numbered C1 to C7) as shorthand to indicate whether the 11 An alternative would be to also take a long position in the CDS on day t if either of RET t-1 or RET t-2 is positive, with the expectation that CDS spreads would decrease in days t to t+k. While we conduct this alternative test as a robustness check, our focus on negative equity returns at t-1 or t-2 comports better with the news environment surrounding the emission cheating scandal, wherein most new stories reflected a negative tone. 12 We also consider an analogous trading rule test assuming that lagged CDS spread changes predict equity returns. However, if this assumption does not hold, we would not expect meaningful results.
market behavior before September 18, 2015, more likely than not resembles the cascade characteristic. 13 We first consider whether "slow and poor information aggregation" occurs (C1) and whether we observe an "evolving state variable dependent on credible endorsement" (C2). We note first that the emission cheating scandal dates back more than a decade when the United States (in 1999) and Europe (in 2005) adopted more stringent emission standards. 14 Because these standards made it obvious that VW's diesel engines would fail, VW introduced the EA 189 engine in many of its new diesel models, which it claimed met the new standards. These models apparently heralded a new strategy to achieve record sales growth in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere. Several of these models secretly contained emission cheating software, however. During this period, the news from VW was generally positive and news stories to the contrary relating to emissions were quickly rebutted by VW and, sometimes, by the German regulatory authorities, arguably interested in promoting the domestic automobile industry. Viewed collectively, we contend that VW's motives for this period of positive news and growth laid the conditions for "poor information aggregation," especially that of information adverse to VW and the industry (C1). While much of the positive information on emissions came from the company, with some support of the government regulator, from the standpoint of a cascade, some of this information also relates to an "evolving state variable" (i.e., the accuracy of emission test results) that was "dependent on credible endorsement" (i.e., from the company and government regulator) (C2). We also surmise that the importance of emission testing information for firm valuation would have been largely idiosyncratic, that is, not a common variable regularly considered in investors' valuation models. We, therefore, construe the pre-scandal information environment as meeting the cascade characteristic of involving idiosyncratic information (C3).
13 For this paper, our analysis of the events and behavior leading up to the EPA notice is purposely brief and is intended to capture only key items that, potentially, relate to our hypothesis of an informational cascade. For more detailed analyses of the timeline leading to the EPA notice, we refer the reader to other sources, such as the chronologies in www. We further contend that some critical information could have been known to a least a "few" through public disclosures (C4 
Event study of pre-scandal events relating to VW emissions
While it is clear from sub-section 4.1 that some critical information would likely have been publicly known to a least a "few" investors (C4), we further check this feature of a cascade by conducting an event study of key prior events related to the scandal. Should this analysis indicate a significant negative response to those prior events, then this would be contrary to criterion C4, namely, that the precursory scandal information was known only to a few and not to many. We analyze the same six events that could have presaged an oncoming scandal, as discussed in the prior section. These While these EPA investigations did not uncover the use of emission cheating devices, the intentional overstatement of fuel efficiency achieved a similar purpose, by allowing these firms to secure emissions credits from the EPA to offset the higher emissions from their larger and more profitable cars. 16 Given that each of these seven characteristics more than likely resembles market behavior before September 18, 2015, the probability that all seven would not be present would then likely be less than 1 percent (0.5 7 assuming independence).
admission to EPA). We calculate the excess returns around these events based on a market-adjusted and a market model. For the market model, we estimate the model parameters using up to 255 trade days not within 30 days of the announcement date. Together, these suggest little reaction to public knowledge relating to the scandal other than the reaction to the September 18 EPA disclosure. For that event, it did impact automakers' returns. The reaction was swift and negative for the automaker sample, with the industry losing 3.2 percent of shareholder value over days -1 to 1. Also, as noted earlier, as the news of the scandal became more widespread, prices dropped even further after day 1. Volkswagen, for example, declined by 28.6 percent over days 0 to 5. In short, consistent with cascade criterion C4, these results indicate that the lead-up events prior to September 18 remained either private or were not sufficiently newsworthy to trigger sufficient concern by investors to move prices. 18 The September 18, 2015 news of the scandal, on the other hand, began to flood the market causing a major spike in information aggregation and a commensurate drop in automakers' share values. Based on the preceding qualitative analysis, we conclude that this evidence supports H1, namely, that the events and behavior leading up to the VW 17 On November 15th (day 1), Volkswagen also reported that October group sales had grown by 5% over the previous month (Source: Factiva). 18 As an additional check of whether some investors might have known about and acted on this information, we examined the bi-weekly series of the ratio of short interest in VW's ADR security (VLKAY) to the number of ADRs outstanding. The average bi-weekly ratio from January 1, 2015 to September 15, 2015 of 0.13 percent jumped only after the September 18, 2015 EPA notice, to 3.37 percent as of September 30, 2015. The average ratio from September 30, 2015 to March 31, 2016 was 1.91 percent. This suggests that shorting investors as a group did not act on the probability that VW would reveal its use of emission cheating devices. Hence, for these specialized investors, the EPA notice would also have been consistent with an unblocking event (characteristic C5). The evidence on whether institutional investors can anticipate scandals is mixed, however. For example, while Bernile, Sulaeman, and Wang (2015) find that institutional investors were able to anticipate firms' activities consistent with stock options backdating prior to firms' actual announcements, there is no evidence of a market reaction prior to [insert Table 2 here]
Analysis of market co-integration: All observations
As a pre-condition for the lagged regression and vector autoregression analysis, we first test for stationarity in the time series of equity returns and CDS spread changes. Panel A of Table 3 shows that we can reject the hypothesis that the individual time series are non-stationary in all cases based on an augmented Dickey-Fuller test and a Phillips-Perron test (Schwert 2002) . 19 We also estimate the autocorrelation functions for each firm and summarize the results in Panel B of Table 3 . This panel shows differences in the evolution of spread changes and equity returns. Specifically, the spread changes show positive autocorrelations for the smaller lags (1, 2, and 3), consistent with an autoregressive process wherein a contemporaneous change reflects a portion of past changes. 20 On the other hand, equity returns show positive autocorrelations at lag 1 and mostly negative autocorrelations at the other lags. Whereas the positive coefficients at lag 1 suggest potential equity return momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993) or data mining (Jegadeesh and Titman 2001) , the negative lags are more consistent with equity returns evolving randomly, as they would with informed and efficient trading.
The results in Table 3 , however, do not formally examine which market might best reflect the presence of informed traders.
[insert Table 3 here] the mean β 5 coefficient is not significant at lag 1 and the mean β 6 coefficient at lag 2 is significantly positive. In short, the evidence of CDS predictability using equity returns is much stronger than the evidence of return predictability using CDS spread changes.
[insert Table 4 here] Table 5 summarizes firm-level regressions of the change in CDS spread on equity return, lagged daily equity return, and control variables before and after the first news of the VW emission cheating scandal. Our focus, though, is the change in the β 4 , β 5 , and β 6 coefficients from the pre-to the postscandal period, which we predict should decrease for β 4 and increase for β 5 and β 6 , reflecting the hypothesized effects of increased co-integration in the CDS and equity markets from accelerated information aggregation (H2). For the sample as a whole, our evidence supports H2, in that the mean β 4 coefficient changes by -0.408 (p < 0.01). Moreover, for each of the German automakers, the β 4 coefficient decreases significantly (p < 0.10) from the pre-to the post-scandal period. Our evidence, however, does not show a significant increase in the mean β 5 coefficient, and the mean β 6 coefficient decreases, which is inconsistent with H2.
Change in market co-integration
[insert Table 5 here]
On closer inspection, however, we observe substantial variation in the change in the regression coefficients across the sample. We first illustrate this change by focusing on VW, the firm most subject to accelerated information aggregation. Figure 3 plots the contemporaneous equity and CDS market reactions for the 20 days with the greatest negative equity return during January 2, 2004 to March 23, 2016. This plot shows that for the 17 days before September 2015, the response of the CDS market is much lower than the response for the three days in September. As anecdotal evidence, this suggests a different reaction in the CDS market to large negative equity returns from before to after the emission scandal.
[insert Figure 3 here] Next, we focus on the sample and calculate the mean changes in the β 4, β 5 , and β 6 coefficients by primary region of operations. We report the mean changes (post minus pre) in Table 5 , which for convenience we plot in Figure 4 . This plot shows that the change in β 4 decreases substantially for VW (which admitted to emission cheating) and for the other European automakers (some of which have been accused of emission cheating). For the US and Asian automakers in our sample (for which no formal accusations of the use of emission cheating devices have been made as of the date of this paper), the plots show almost no change in the mean coefficients. 21 In other words, the disruption in market co-integration most visibly occurs for the German automakers and, to a lesser degree, the other European firms. This evidence supports H3, namely, that the increase in the co-integration of the equity and credit markets in response to the VW emission cheating scandal varies with the operating environment of each automaker.
[insert Figure 4 here] 21 Japanese automobile regulators, however, have conducted tests documenting that Toyota, Nissan, and Mitsubishi overstated emission levels for certain of their diesel-powered passenger cars (Wall Street Journal, March 4, 2016). Table 6 examines the lead-lag relation in daily equity returns and CDS spread changes using unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) analysis of order two. This approach jointly estimates the strength of associations within each series and across the two series in both directions at lags 1 and 2.
Vector autoregression analysis
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Panel A reports the coefficients from this analysis applied to the full sample period. The clearest result is the consistency of negative coefficients for CHCDS-RET for lag 1. This represents the φ 3 coefficient in Eq. (4). We expect this to be negative consistent with Tables 4 and 5 showing that RET t-1 leads CHCDS t . Similar to Table 5 , Table 6 also shows an overall positive coefficient for CHCDS-CHCDS (the relation between lagged and contemporaneous CHCDS) at lags 1 and 2, and positive and negative coefficients, respectively, for RET-RET (the relation between lagged and contemporaneous RET) at lags 1 and 2. In untabulated analyses, we also find predictably different results for the pre-and postscandal periods analyzed separately as VAR regressions. For example, consistent with H2, the sample mean (median) φ 3 coefficient is -0.2862 (-0.1907 ) for the pre-scandal period and -0.0844 (-0.0794) for the post-scandal period (or an increase of 0.2018 in the mean and 0.1113 in the median). Moreover, consistent with H3, the largest change in the φ 3 coefficient from pre-to post-scandal is for VW specifically (0.5353) and for the German automakers as a group (0.3674). In short, the VAR results in Table 6 mirror the regression results in Tables 4 and 5 . Both suggest that the location of informed trading resides in the equity market (Table 4) , and both suggest greater equality of informedness of CDS and equity investors in the post-VW-emission-cheating-scandal period (Table 5) .
[insert CHCDS does not Granger-cause RET. This result also suggests that the location of informed trading resides in the equity market. In untabulated analysis, we also find strong support for the view that RET Granger-causes CHCDS in the pre-scandal period analyzed. Additionally, consistent with greater market co-integration in the post-scandal period (H2), we cannot reject the hypothesis that RET does not Granger-cause CHCDS in the pre-scandal period for 3 out of the 16 firms (versus 11 out of 16 in the post-scandal period), and we cannot reject the hypothesis that CHCDS does not Granger-cause RET in the pre-scandal period for 9 out of the 16 firms (versus 15 out of 16 in the post-scandal period).
Trading rule analysis
Panel A of Table 7 shows the additional CDS spread and the change in CDS spread in basis points (bps) from before to after first news of the VW emission cheating scandal from day 0 to day t (t = 1 to 5) based on the following hypothetical trading rule. If RET t-1 or RET t-2 < 0 for a firm, then short the same firm's five-year CDS securities at the end of t-1 and accrue the change in CDS spread (defined as CDS t -CDS 0 ) from day 0 to day t, where t = 1 to 5, otherwise do nothing. Because we predict an increase in spread given prior equity returns, we view this as a proxy for a trading rule that exploits lagged informed trading by CDS investors. The third and fourth rows of each panel show the change in spread from the pre-to the post-scandal period, that is,
for each automaker and the mean and median across the sample. Given an increase in market cointegration, we expect a decrease in the profitability of CDS trading based on prior equity returns. Table 7 shows these decreases as positive numbers. We first observe that trading profits decrease from the pre-to the post-scandal period generally for all firms for all holding periods, and the decreases increase in the number of days in the holding period. This suggests that the ability of lagged equity return extends beyond the one-to two-day lag shown in the earlier tables. On a daily basis, however, the decreases in CDS t -CDS 0 from before to after the scandal are economically small. For example, the mean decrease in spread from pre-to post-scandal for the five-day trading rule period is 2.39 bps.
However, if judged on an annualized basis, the overall profitability could increase substantially depending on the number of repetitions per year (e.g., the number of trading days) and the in-and-out costs of execution.
[insert Table 7 here]
We also partition the trading rule profits on operating region and summarize the results in Panel B
of Table 7 . This panel shows results consistent with the regressions. The decrease in spread, which we contend stems from greater market co-integration from the scandal, is predictably greater for automakers in those regions directly affected by the scandal and predictably lower in regions not subject to allegations of automakers' involvement. For example, for the five-day trading rule, German automakers' mean spread decreases by 5.51 bps, whereas US and Asian companies exhibit small changes, of -1.51 bps and 0.90 bps, respectively. For convenience, Figure 5 shows the same averages as in Table 7 . Rather than show changes in raw spread, the figure shows the changes in percentage terms (by multiplying the relative changes in Table 7 by 100). As with Table 7 , this plot shows a general monotonic decline in the reduction of trading profits across regions as a result of the scandal, with the German automakers being most affected.
[insert Figure 5 here]
Conclusion
We investigate the information aggregation and market price response of the world's largest automakers to the VW emission cheating scandal of 2015-2016. Our examination produces two important findings of interest to financial economists, investors, and regulators, especially those interested in the economics of the automobile industry. We first examine and contend that the events and market behavior leading up to the VW emission cheating scandal closely resemble an informational cascade unblocked by the EPA notice. This qualitative analysis complements a mostly theoretical literature that shows few examples of informational cascades in practice, which is surprising given the conclusions from models and experiments that cascades exist as important economic phenomena that disrupt markets. We also confirm our contention of an informational cascade based on an event study of key pre-scandal events that could have revealed information about a possible cheating scandal well before the EPA notice but for the presence of an informational cascade. Equity prices showed no significant negative reaction to these events.
Second, we test for the effects of an informational cascade by analyzing the evolution of equity prices and CDS spreads in two markets that naturally integrate through their use of common information. Based on measures of market co-integration applied in the prior literature, we predict and find that the accelerated information aggregation from the scandal produces a "game-changing" increase in the contemporaneous association between equity returns and CDS spread changes in the post-scandal period, that is, after the EPA notice of violation on September 18, 2015. This association, moreover, varies predictably with global automakers' actual or potential involvement in the scandal.
Additionally, we predict and find that the profitability of a trading rule based on the assumption of more informed trading in the equity market decreases in the post-scandal era, as the information shock arguably creates less imbalance in the relative informedness of equity traders relative to CDS traders.
Lastly, our study adds new results to a nascent literature on the impact of crises on securities markets' co-integration, by showing that firm-related scandals, like financial or banking crises, can disrupt markets. These results further imply that the putative informational cascade dislodged by the EPA order may have increased the informational efficiency of automakers' securities markets, at least regarding the pricing of credit through CDS trading. We leave unexplored, however, whether this putative change in market efficiency from the VW scandal contributed to the social good (Zingales 2015) , for example, because of automakers' increased information transparency or regulators' increased enforcement efficacy. This table shows the market capitalization, five-year CDS spread, and equity return (or equivalent return on the firm's exchange-traded security if the home country exchange was closed) for the sample of 16 major worldwide automobile manufacturing firms over the days around the initial news on September 18, 2015 (Reuters 12:10pm EDT) of the EPA order stating that VW intentionally violated the US emission standard for certain VW and Audi diesel passenger cars. The column "all obs." refers to the mean over the full sample period of January 1, 2004 to March 23, 2016. na=not available due to exchange closure. This table reports mean and median cumulative excess returns (day -1 to 1) and (day -2 to 2) for six key event dates starting on May 13, 2013 and ending on September 18, 2015 when the EPA made public the emission cheating scandal. Expected returns are determined using a market-adjusted model (MAR) and market model (MM). For the market model, we estimate alpha and beta using daily data. The calculation estimates the parameters using up to 255 trade days (not within 30 days of the event date). , where RET t-k = equity return on day t-k for k = 0, 1, and 2, CHCDS t-k = percentage change in five-year CDS spread on day t-k for k = 0, 1, and 2, MKT = return on market index, SMB and HML = Fama-French size and book-to-market ratio factors, respectively, and ε t = uncorrelated error, all on day t. The ttests are based on Huber-White robust standard errors. Binomial prob. relates to the number of positive coefficients. where CHCDS = percentage change in the five-year CDS spread, MKT = return on market index, SMB and HML = Fama-French size and book-to-market ratio factors, respectively, and ε t = uncorrelated error, all on day t, and where RET t-k = equity return on day t-k for k = 0, 1, and 2. Sig. tests whether the post-scandal RET coefficient differs from the pre-scandal RET coefficient assuming robust standard errors (adjusted for time-series heteroskedasticity), where *** <.01, **<.05, *<.10. t-value tests whether the VW coefficient differs from the coefficient of the other 15 firms. binomial prob. tests the cumulative probability of observing at least the number of positive coefficients given an underlying probability of 0.5. The t-tests are based on Huber-White robust standard errors. Table 7 The ability of lagged equity return to predict change in CDS spread: Hypothetical trading rule tests before and after first news of the VW emission cheating scandal Panel A shows the additional CDS spread (in basis points) and the change in CDS spread (in basis points) from before to after first news of the VW emission cheating scandal from day 0 to day t (t =1 to 5) based on the following hypothetical trading rule: If RET t-1 or RET t-2 < 0, then short five-year CDS securities at the end of t-1 and accrue the change in spread (CHCDS) from day 0 to day t, where t =1 to 5, otherwise do nothing. Panel B summarizes the results in Panel A for the four regions where the automakers primarily operate. 
Figure 4
Mean change in automobile firm time-series regression coefficient by region from before to after disclosure of the VW emission cheating scandal for Ret Lag 0 and Ret Lag 1 from the time-series regressions of CDS spread change on equity return, lagged equity return, and control variables. Coeff.: Ret Lag 1
Figure 5
Percentage decrease in CDS spread from before to after the VW emission cheating scandal from a trading strategy based on the negative relation between CDS spread and lagged equity return 
